Chronique
Nord-Nord-Ouest
OPSA Idées et débats sur les questions politiques dans l'Arctique OPSA
www.arctique.uqam.ca

The Politics of Security in the Arctic: Enabling innovative initiatives in partnership with the Inuit

Lori A. Crowe
Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies
Department of Political Science
York University

" Things had happened so fast – with the government arriving and then the mining and oil companies – that none of the dozens of bureaucrats and anthropologists and politicians who considered the changes in the native economy and culture thought there was any point in bothering to isolate the impact of the military. You could comb dozens probably hundreds of articles on the strategic significance of the Arctic and never read a word about the people who lived there. " (McMahon 1988: 63)

" We do not wish our traditional territories to be treated as a strategic military and combat zone between Eastern and Western alliances. For thousands of years, Inuit have used and continue to use the lands, waters and sea ice in circumpolar regions. As aboriginal people, we are the Arctic's legitimate spokespersons. Since our northern lands and communities transcend the boundaries of the four countries, we are in a unique position to promote peace, security and arms control objectives among states of the Arctic Rim. " –Mary Simon (Loukacheva 2007:128)

In the summer of 2007 Canada announced plans to increase its Arctic military presence in an effort to assert sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. The promises made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper during his Throne Speech and in several policy speeches prominently featured an ambitious and costly (roughly C$5.3 billion over five years) commitment to military reinvestment, including : six to eight arctic patrol ships which will guard what he says are Canadian waters; a deep water port built near Iqaluit a region the U.S. Geological Survey estimates has as much as 25 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and gas ; a surveillance system to detect submarines under the ice cap, and ; plans to modernize the Canadian Rangers. Harpers announcement effectively returned the strategic importance of the Arctic for Canada's security and defense to the forefront of concern for many politicians, academics, and foreign governments.

The plan, however, was announced without any consultation with the Inuit who have occupied this region for hundreds of years. The Liberal MP for Iqaluit Nancy Karetak-Lindell said : " People here were upset, " that the federal government was acting " like it was still the 1960s[1]. " This glaring omission by the Canadian government of Inuit autonomy, and inattention to their concerns, is in step with a history of disregard by the Canadian government and military of the inhabitants of the Arctic. This is in spite of

[1] This lack of consultation is not so surprising: in response to a speech by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark to the House of Commons on 10 September 1985 which called for an increased military presence in the Arctic, national and regional Inuit associations issued briefs before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations stating sovereignty is "more securely founded upon continuing Inuit use and occupation of the area than upon its militarization". The Committee responded with recommendations that called on the Canadian government to make Inuit interests a priority, and, interestingly, called on Canada to seek the demilitarization of the region, something the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) has been advocating for years.

the centrality of the Canadian Arctic in past and future security and defense military activity, which has and undoubtedly will continue to severely affect the economy, environment, politics, and living standards, and cultural survival of the residents of the Arctic.

This grave oversight also calls attention to a serious misnomer : the recent progress that has been made by the Inuit has led to overly optimistic analyses on the part of scholars and policy-makers with regard to the current state of Inuit economic, political, and social progress and the future of Canada-Inuit relations. There has undeniably been significant progress, due almost entirely to the activism and effort of individuals and communities that have resulted in vital gains for Inuit recognition and autonomy. These include the development of Inuit initiatives for the protection and promotion of Inuit interests and concerns, including institutional and informal actions ; the creation of Nunavut and the NLCA (Nunavut Land Claims Agreement), and ; the creation and continued participation of the Inuit in organizations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) (which is the vehicle through which the Inuit of Canada are able to exercise their mandate in the Arctic Council and maintain an involvement in the activities and decision-making processes regarding the Arctic). However, in spite of these positive movements in Canadian-Indigenous relations, the extent to which Inuit voice's are being heard and are able to affect decision-making outcomes is seriously undermined[2]. This is occurring at the jurisdictional level and also as a result of an epistemological/cosmological divide which the Canadian government fails to recognize as a crucial component in Canadian/Inuit relations. Thus, despite the optimism with which scholars and government officials often view the future of Indigenous peoples in Canada, when it comes to issues of defense, security, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over policy making, legal and informal decision-making processes exclude the Northern aboriginal peoples in the most significant and detrimental of ways.

Historically, issues of defense, security and sovereignty in the Arctic have been definitively and for the most part solely conducted by the military : " The Arctic ", explains Østreng " has gradually been transformed from a *military vacuum* prior to World War II, to a *military flank* in the 1950-70 period, and a *military front* in the 1980s[3] ". With recognition of the Arctic as strategically important during WWII, the military's " ' discovery ' of the North "[4] resulted in a massive influx of money, military and civilian activity, the building of infrastructure, research, and extensive military operations and exercises, largely from the United States. This occurred on indigenous homelands, settlements, and burial grounds and radically impacted the environment, hunting patterns, economic development, and cultural survival of the northern indigenous peoples and even included the forced relocation of communities and the uncompensated appropriation of land without the consent of local populations. Inuit desire for and entitlement to involvement in international relations – particularly in matters of security and defense – is substantiated by the effects of historical Canadian decisions and actions in the Arctic. The strategic importance of Inuit homelands in security and defense-matters and an understanding of how historically the local populations have been adversely impacted is adequate justification for formally including Inuit voices in contemporary issues of security and defence[5].

What we are witnessing in the Arctic is part of a larger trend in civil-military relations and their implications for regional security and global security via the segregation of military/security/defense priorities from

[2] Natalia Loukacheva. *The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut*, Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 2007, p. 122-123.

[3] Willy Østreng. "Political-Military Relations among the Ice States: The Conceptual Basis of State Behaviour", In Franklin Griffiths (ed.), *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North*. Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens Canadian Papers in Peace Studies, 1992.

[4] Natalia Loukcheva, *op.cit.*, p. 136.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 132.

sustainable security. In particular Canada's military commitments have had devastating repercussions on and for aboriginal communities, culture and way of life, and much of what occurred in the past as a product of US and Canadian military concerns was " beyond the sight of even the Canadian government[6] ". The current failure of the Canadian government to consult with Northern aboriginal peoples prior to announcing its plans for a re-militarization of the North suggests that perhaps our primary concern should be Canada's reliance on the military as an approach in the North – which appears to warrant the complete disregard for Inuit concerns and desired involvement in the decision-making process – and is thus integrally related to any future development, research, and protection of the land and people in the Arctic North. Acknowledgement of the violent interactions of the military with indigenous people in the assertion of sovereignty and defense in the past is integral in facing contemporary challenges of sovereignty assertion, resource development, and securitization in the North.

An excerpt from McMahons's book *Arctic Twilight*[7] helps us better understand the enormous and devastating effects of military incursions into Inuit homelands in the past. The following passage describes some of the visible changes seen by Jack Ferguson, a researcher sent by Canada to report on the radar sites, when the U.S military began installation of the DEW Line radar sites in the spring of 1956 :

In the boom camps encircling the radar sites the banging and trundle of construction reverberated through every Inuit tent and shack and was, Ferguson felt, disintegrating the foundations of social organisation. There was no time to go out hunting and what game there was nearby had disappeared. People started relying on food and clothing shipped to the sites from trading posts. When, as sometimes happened, the shipments didn't get through, men could eat in the military mess halls but women and children went hungry and were forced to beg at the back door[8]*.*

The traditional order of the Inuit communities, Ferguson reports, were being " turned on its head " by the military presence. Culturally, economically, and socially, communities were being broken down by the military incursion into Inuit society :

[...] men no longer hunted together; old dances and songs, already frowned on by the missionaries, had become the property of the old, replaced for everyone else by American movies at the Air Force base... The work week left men too exhausted to play with their children or talk to their wives. Women, robbed of their own work, had been reduced by partners to babysitters. Kids were learning nothing. Elsewhere, some people who heard of the boom sweeping the land even stopped trapping in anticipation of the wind of wealth blowing their way[9]*.*

The evacuation of the military from areas where they operated in the Arctic often created additional problems. Following the completion of the DEW Line, for example, the military essentially left an industrial wasteland of abandoned buildings and warehouses and leftover construction materials scattered across the land. Moreover, this sudden mass departure created mass unemployment for the Inuit who had been hired to work on the DEW Line, effectively producing a skewed social structure and financial insecurity in Inuit society. In one community for example, a liquor and oil reserve was abandoned that reportedly took the Inuit twenty years to deplete[10]. One old man recounted : " In those days, the Russians didn't realize there were some people living up here. Same with the Americans, they didn't realize. Same with even the government of Canada, they didn't even recognize that there were some Inuit living up here, even though it's their own country[11]. " The Arctic turned out to be, " a kind of perfect military playground[12] " – at

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 136.
[7] Kevin McMahon. *Arctic Twilight: Reflections on the Destiny of Canada's Northern Land and People*, Toronto : James Lorimer& Company, 1988
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 34-35.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.,* p.*37.*
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 39.

the lifetime expense of the Inuit. The low level military flight testing in the Happy Valley - Goose Bay Military Base and the coerced/forced migration and settlement to Grise Ford, Resolute Bay, and Davis Inlet[13] are other such pivotal instances in Inuit-Canadian relations that bring to light the magnitude of the effects of the military industrialization on the environment, the people, and their means of survival. Such reflection on the effects of military developments in the past is essential in any discussion on how to move forward on the issue of sovereignty assertion in the Arctic.

Legal jurisdiction for a formal partnership

While the governments three pronged approach to sovereignty assertion in the North - which includes economic development, environmental protection, and the protection of national land, air and water – is welcome by many, several warning flags in fact indicate the precariousness of Canada's new promises for coherent and strategic Arctic policies that will see implementation. First, historically, Canada's interest in the Arctic has been largely reactionary, first in 1969 by stopping the American *SS Manhattan*, second in 1985 by using legal measures following the passage of American ice breaker *Polar Sea* through the Northwest Passage, and then again recently in August 2007 following the Russian expedition to plant a titanium flag on the Arctic seabed[14]. Second, that environmental protection even factors into the governments approach appears to be grossly contradicted by the fact that 1) Harper was until recently of the camp who denied climate change[15]. 2) Harper's promise to foreign business interests that "the untapped oil, gas and mineral riches of the Arctic are a major factor in his description of Canada as an energy and mining 'superpower'" and, 3) the government "still does not have an overall plan for environmental monitoring[16]".

Finally, despite the existing 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), which is the only treaty to include sovereignty provisions and processes that specifically mentions monitoring and offshore management, the government has failed to implement it[17]. The reality has been, as the President of Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada Duane Smith has pointed out, that

[13] During the 1950's one of the most traumatic events in Inuit-government relations occurred, often referred to as the 'High Arctic exiles" in which the government of Canada 'coerced' and 'manipulated' (essentially forced) the migration of northern Quebec Inuit. The government moved a number of Inuit families from Port Harrison and Baffin Island to areas of the High Arctic that had been unoccupied for hundreds of years. They were moved to establish the small communities of Resolute, on southern Cornwallis Island and Grise Fjord at the southern tip of Ellesmere Island - the Inuit of Grise Fjord became Canada's most northerly permanent residents. While the government argued its motive was to provide a land that could support the Inuit better, Inuit oral evidence and scholars condemn the relocation as part of a government effort to strengthen its claim to northern islands, and that Inuit people were exploited for strategic reasons. McMahon, *op. cit.*, p. 39

[14] In fact, the Canadian government did not make its presence felt in the north until it felt its sovereignty in the Arctic was threatened - Canada was a reluctant and late entrant into a relationship with the Inuit and Subarctic First Nations, showing little interest in taking up responsibilities in the North, especially if it involved commitments to Native peoples. It was largely intrusions into the North by Americans, potentially threatening Canada's hold on the region that altered this thinking. With World War II, the Arctic was considered essential for strategic military purposes and Canadian and American military began construction of airfields, barracks, hangars, roads, and other facilities. Essentially then, as McMahon notes, "The whole of Canada's involvement with the Inuit amounted to one big sovereignty exercise". Sharda Vaidyanath. "Inuit Could be Allies in Struggle for Arctic Sovereignty, Critics Say", *Epoch Times Parliament Hill Reporter*, available online [http://www.xzone-radio.com/news/inuit.htm].

[15] Terry Fenge. "Inuit and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement: Supporting Canada's Arctic Sovereignty", *Policy Options*, Dec 2007-Jan 2008, p. 84.

[16] Mary Simon. "Inuit: the Bedrock of Arctic Sovereignty", *The Globe and Mail*, Op-Ed Archive, Inuit TapiriitKanatami, 2005, available online : [http://www.itk.ca/media/OpEds/OpEd_20070726_ArctricSovereignty.php].

[17] In fact, the Nunavut Inuit issued a one billion dollar lawsuit against the Federal government on this lack of implementation last year.

the Harper government 'deals with' the Inuit using an "arms-length approach[18]". Promises regarding social and economic development and environmental protection evaporate under military sovereignty exercises; discussions around the fragile Arctic ecosystem and its importance to the Inuit inhabitants is brushed aside for the economic potential in the oil and gas reserves that lie beneath it. On her national speaking tour on Arctic sovereignty, Mary Simon the president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, emphasized the importance of a holistic and long-term approach, arguing that sovereignty rests primarily in the country's inhabitants : "Arctic sovereignty rests on viable communities, sound civil administration and responsible environmental management, not just ports, training facilities and military exercises[19]".

The historic and contemporary military significance of the Canadian North and the vulnerability of Inuit lands to militarization as a result of strategic military interests[20] in combination with the reasons mentioned above suggest that it is not enough to pay close attention to the promises Canada makes and the lip-service made to consultation mechanisms with Indigenous peoples. Several scholars have begun to recognize that the government should respect the legal capability of indigenous people and "allow the Inuit direct participation in International affairs where their homelands are concerned and in security issues relevant to the development of their lands[21]". Currently, the Inuit are able to actively participate informally in international relations via various forms of international cooperation and indigenous internationalism. The Arctic Council, which was established in 1996 by the 8 Arctic States, is one of the most established informal arrangements that allows the Inuit of the Circumpolar North to have 'voice' in international forums. A Canadian initiative, the Arctic Council operates as a :

[...] high-level forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic governments, indigenous communities, and other Northern residents on common Arctic issues. In particular, these include issues of environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic; the dissemination of information; encouraging education and promoting interest in Arctic related matters; and coordinating and overseeing activities established under specific Arctic programs[22].

The Council can issue 'soft-law' recommendations/declarations for action and has produced initiatives such as the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report* and the *Arctic Human Development Report*[23]. It is through the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), a permanent actor in the Council, that the Inuit of Nunavut and other circumpolar regions in Canada are able to express their mandate. Emerging in 1976 and formally established in 1980 with an official Charter, the ICC represents more than 155,000 Inuit from Canada, Greenland, Alaska, and the Chukotka Peninsula. Since its infancy the ICC has advanced indigenous peoples' rights and interests from security and human right issues to economic and trade concerns. The ICC can make proposals to the Council, participate in all meetings and activities, and moreover, signifies the future potential for greater representation in the international arena and the collaboration internationally on Indigenous initiatives. As Loukacheva[24] importantly argues, "Indigenous internationalism and the ICC's influential role prove that 'Inuit have a legitimate,

[18] Sharda Vaidyanath, *loc.cit.*
[19] The Canadian Press, "Asserting Arctic Sovereignty", Canoe Network: CNEWS, October 23, 2007, available online : [http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2007/10/23/pf-4598847.html].
[20] Natalia Loukacheva. *op.cit.,* p. 128.
[21] Kevin McMahon. *op.cit.,* p. 4.
[22] Henning Brøndsted. 1973. "Ruling in Greenland and Forms of Integration into Denmark: The Established Legal Components", In Jean Malaurie, (ed.), *The Eskimo People To-day and To-morrow*. Paris : Mouton, 1973, p. 555-556; Henning Brøndsted. "The Historical Development of the Greenlandic Judicial System", In Henrik G. Jensen and Torben Agersnap, (eds.), *Crime, Law and Justice in Greenland*. Copenhagen : New Social Science Monographs, 1996, p. 120-121.
[23] Natalia Loukacheva. *op.cit.*, p. 122.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 123-127.

extensive and varied role to fulfill in international matters'[25] ".

Formally, however, the limited legal capacity of a subnational entity like the ICC and Nunavut in international and domestic law and the lack of jurisdictional power and limited capabilities of the Arctic Council restrict the Inuit from having any jurisdiction over decisions on security and defense policy in the Arctic[26]. The Arctic Council, and the ICC through it, is restricted in several contexts. First, as a ' high-level forum ' it is not classified legally as an international organization under international law. Second, with no permanent resources or administrative structure, the Council's operation is inconsistent and therefore decisions can be unpredictable. Third, as an intergovernmental structure of nation states, Inuit (and Nunavut's) involvement through the ICC is significantly limited due to the restricted legal capacity of sub-national entities in international law. Overall, the Arctic Council has been criticized, explains Loukacheva, for its " limited organizational capacity, lack of authority to make binding decisions, severe shortage of financial and other resources, and an increasing overlap in its activities with other international actors in the Arctic region[27] ". Similarly, while the ICC in particular is playing an increasingly influential role in international policy making, visible in successes such as facilitating diplomacy in the Circumpolar North and lobbying national governments,[28] its' jurisdictional power is non-existent. Categorized as a non-governmental organization within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, the ICC retains consultative status category 2, which limits its advisory status and voting rights[29]. In sum, despite such mechanisms for contribution to the international arena, the Inuit (and the new territory of Nunavut) are systematically excluded from the formal arena of politics and relegated to a passive role in our political social imaginary as representative figureheads.

It is crucial that the Inuit assert the legislated right to be involved in international activities and security policy-making, argues Loukacheva, and at the very least a significant role in the consultation process as part of a partnership with Inuit organizations, for several reasons : 1) the unique cultural, economic, linguistic, environmental and geographical conditions of the Inuit require an expanded notion legal autonomy in the area of foreign affairs, 2) existing Inuit internationalism and contemporary trends of globalization are already pushing in this direction, and 3) this would allow for local concerns to be included in any decision-making process[30]. Nunavut wishes to be involved in security policies and international decision making and is justified in this endeavor when the issue at hand involves their land and local concerns, and when as we've seen, national defense policies can and will have direct effects on Inuit territories – informal involvement, while significant, is not sufficient. These are, as Loukacheva declares, justifiable grounds, for legitimating the voices of Nunavut in areas of security and defense and formally recognizing Inuit voices in a legal capacity when their lands are concerned[31].

Moving Forward

Absolutely crucial to any discussion of Arctic sovereignty is the recognition of Innu and Inuit voices and an understanding of the multiple ways in which Canada has been a site of contestation in which Innu and Inuit individuals and communities are actively organizing and resisting these violent interventions that have resulted in political, social, and economic instability. Past and present government agents and missionaries have exercised authority over the Inuit and Innu as an accompaniment to economic, industrial, and military developments which

[25] Mary Simon, *loc.cit.*, 1985, p. 33.
[26] Natalia Loukacheva. *op.cit.*, p. 103-127.
[27] *Ibid., p. 122.*
[28] The ICC has, importantly, made several groundbreaking contributions to the promotion of Inui/Indigenous rights, including the establishment of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000 and contributing to the development of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People adopted by the UNHRC in 2006. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 122-126.
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 104.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 132, 143.

have involved relocating and transforming the people, with little or no consideration to any adverse consequences that might follow from coercing a people to give up their way of life. These events are intimately connected to enduring colonial power arrangements that manifest in the governments actions and attitudes towards the Inuit ; that is, the laws, institutions, studies, consultations, and other interactions with the Canadian government have contributed to epistemic violence and a cultural ethnocide which has and continues to rely on imperial attitudes and assumptions operating through a liberal order framework.[32] Today, a lack of consultation mechanisms, the failure to understand/ ' consult' on Inuits ' own terms, the failure to consider the different cosmologies, and reporting and research mechanisms by the government and individual further perpetuate homogenizing attitudes and assumptions. McMahon explains : " The dramatic differences in outlook and way of life between the Inuit and non-Inuit populations require approaches to the development of autonomy in the Arctic that take into account indigenous values and knowledge[33]. "

Interestingly, for the most part Inuit organizations have welcomed the renewed focus on the Arctic acknowledging the importance of monitoring and research for the sustainability of the Arctic's' unique environment as well as the potential economic benefits for the communities. Paul Kaludjak, president of Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. which oversees the implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, declared that Inuit organizations applauded Harpers announcement, aspiring for a more ambitious and active foreign policy – facilitated in partnership with the Inuit : " Inuit who live in the Canadian Arctic are proud Canadians, and we invite the government of Canada to engage with us to protect the Canadian Arctic[34] ". Northern premiers have asked to have a say in security and defence developments that affect their lands, for instance in Canada's negotiation with the US on the ballistic missile defence system, insisting that a 'positive role' would reflect a ' true partnership '[35].

However, Nunavut authorities and Inuit spokespeople continue to emphasize that security in the Arctic needs to go far beyond military operations and operations and needs to prioritize the living conditions for people in the Circumpolar North, including, most importantly the economic and environmental problems caused by past disturbances of the military. Franklyn Griffiths proposes ' the practice of civility ' as an alternative to military operations in the North[36]. Inuit representatives have developed and written a report advancing sustainable security in the North as opposed to militarization, calling for the right of Nunavut's authorities to be informed on all security issues regarding their homelands, waters, air space, ice, game, limited resources, military action, and to be included in policy-making that concern these elements[37]. In fact, several Inuit authorities repeatedly emphasize that the best way for Canada to assert sovereignty over the Arctic.is by making the homelands of Northern citizens a better place to live[38]. As Mary Simon, president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (the national Inuit association,

[32] For a significant and thorough examination of International Relation's inattention (specifically) and Western theory's omission more generally of Indigenous peoples see J. Marshall Beier. *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Theory*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. For an extensive anthologies of essays exploring the field of critical Inuit studies and methodological problems in Indigenous research, see also Pamela Stern and Lisa Stevenson, eds.. *Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography*, London: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.

[33] Kevin McMahon, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

[34] Paul Kaludjak. "Sovereignty and Inuit in the Canadian Arctic". Posted November 18th, 2006, available online : [http://www.arcticpeoples.org/2006/11/18/sovereignty-and-inuit-in-the-canadian-arctic/].

[35] Jane George. "U.S. Defence Researchers Eye High Arctic", *Nunatsiaq News*, 5 March 2004. ; Jane George. "Northern Premiers Want Involvement in Missile Defense", *Nunatsiaq News*, 12 September 2003.

[36] (138-139, 1999b: 280-309)

[37] Nalatia Loukacheva, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

[38] Jim Bell. "A Better Way", *Nunatsiaq News*, 3 September 2004.

representing about 55,000 Inuit in Canada) argues, military policies – particularly in light of their impact on the Inuit historically, are insufficient at best when in absence of larger social, economic, and environmental policies :

Coherent Arctic policies, both domestic and foreign, must be grounded in long-term strategic thinking and the substantial investment of time, talent and money in both infrastructure and the social fabric of the region... Arctic sovereignty rests on viable communities, sound civil administration and responsible environmental management, not just ports, training facilities and military exercises[39].

When asked to comment on whether or not there are concerns that, as indicated in Steven Harper's Throne Speech, plans to militarize Canada's claim on the Arctic will overshadow other Arctic policies, Simon responded :

Yes, Inuit do have concerns that the federal government will focus heavily on a narrow range of military measures. Inuit are patriotic Canadians, and we believe that Canada must have an adequate military presence and surveillance capacity in the Arctic. That said, an effective sovereignty and security program in the Arctic should be multi-pronged, and investments in that program, where possible, should be multi-purpose. For example, an Arctic based commercial fishing fleet, with appropriate port and harbour infrastructure, could bolster Canadian use of Arctic waters while creating stronger communities and badly needed jobs for the Inuit. The Nunavut Land Claims agreement calls for a Nunavut Marine Council to co-ordinate planning and regulation of waters within the Arctic archipelago – implementing this feature of the Agreement would both enhance sovereignty at a practical level and show good faith in honouring land claims rights.[....] As many Inuit leaders have stated, coherent Arctic policies must put the long-term needs of Inuit communities and households squarely at the centre, and that means tackling honestly and creatively the major social and economic problems that we face[40].

The politics of security and sovereignty in the Arctic are complex – the feasibility of military operations, international law, and international organizations, environmental sustainability, and colonial histories and indigenous values and perspectives are all factors that must be taken into consideration. It is important to listen to the accounts of the people who have lived in these areas and to engage with writings from outside of the academe and government policy papers – it is these voices who are largely ignored as having anything to tell us about security, sovereignty and militarization, and yet it is these accounts which are most vital to any future decision making in the North. At this point, the government has failed to effectively engage the Innu and Inuit on the security of the North and sovereignty assertion. There are a multiplicity of voices that need to be included not only in these areas but which are also vital to understanding the implications and repercussions of policy-making on broader environmental, political, cultural, health, safety, and economic issues. Organizations, communities, and individuals need to be involved in the design process of consultations. The ITK have released a Report detailing their concerns and recommendations for a strategy in the Arctic that needs to be implemented[41]. The Canadian government cannot just chose to listen seriously to such groups; a partnership means that research is not done *on* aboriginals and policies are scripted *for* aboriginals but *with* them. As Simon argues, " Inuit believe that the Arctic can and should be governed and developed in constructive and creative ways that are, at the same time, good for Inuit who live there, good for Canada, and consistent with a more secure and co-operative international order... Act in

[39] Sovereignty and the Arctic. *Globe and Mail Update*, October 22, 2007. Mary Simon taking questions Mon from 1-2p.m. EDT, available online : [Http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071019.wmarysimondiscussion1].

[40] *Ibid*.

[41] An Integrated Arctic Strategy. *Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami*, January 2008, available online : [www.ikk.ca/publications/22012008IntegratedArcticStrategy.pdf].

partnership with us, not in disregard for our rights[42] ".

L'OPSA tient à remercier ses partenaires :

Institut d'études internationales de Montréal UQÀM

Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes

CEPES CENTRE D'ÉTUDES DES POLITIQUES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DE SÉCURITÉ

[42] Sovereingty In the Arctic, *loc. cit.*