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Multiculturalism and Discrimination in Canada and Quebec

The Case of Arabs and Muslims

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Although Canada often presents itself to the rest of the world as a model to be emulated with regard to the handling of ethnocultural diversity, the political and social practices related to this are not devoid of tensions. As in other liberal democracies, Canadian policy on immigration and the management of ethnocultural diversity is part of a "liberal paradox." It sets often irreconcilable goals: the supply of labour, control of temporary migrant workers and asylum seekers, management of urban problems, reduction of social security spending, maintenance of public order and security, respect for human rights, integration of minorities into public institutions, and the redefining of national identity. The reactions to the events of 9/11, the worldwide security climate, and the rise of neoconservatism have contributed to making this articulation of different goals more complex.

This paradox is especially keen with respect to Arab and Muslim minorities. In their case, the security agenda has directly affected their human rights and their rights as citizens. But there has been little field research on the viewpoints of associations that speak for Arab and Muslim groups. This chapter aims to fill this gap. After contrasting Canadian multiculturalism with Quebec interculturalism, we present and analyze the viewpoints of these associations regarding Canadian and Quebec policies and their implementation in the areas of security, immigration, and social and economic integration.

We draw on qualitative interviews with associations that are (1) active in political lobbying on issues that are of great concern to Arabs and Muslims and (2) active in Quebec (even if they are pan-Canadian in scope). This means that a number of important associations that are not involved in advocacy work around Canadian and Quebec policy are not represented. Further, a preliminary clarification is in order concerning the terms "Arab" and "Muslim," which have complex intersections (as discussed in Chapter 1, this volume). Even if a minority of Muslims are also Arabs (one in five in the world), the majority of Arabs are Muslims (but not all of them). Islam was born in Arabia and Arabic is the language of the Quran. Moreover, Islamic culture and history have been fundamental in defining Arabism as a political movement. In Canada, political advocacy on Arab social and political issues is closely intertwined with advocacy on similar Muslim issues, except for specifically religious ones. We have thus included in our sample the major advocacy associations that constitute a voice for Muslim Arabs. Some are secular and do not define themselves as Muslim but as Arab (in this case, they also tend to include non-Muslim Arabs in their membership). Others define themselves as Muslim (in this case, they include non-Arab Muslims). Taken together, the set of associations included in this sample is the main voice that speaks out on issues of concern in this chapter. These associations are involved in advocacy and have a track record of intervening on the themes under discussion. All the interviews in this study were carried out between March 2006 and November 2006. The spokespersons agreed to speak in the name of their respective associations, not in their individual names. Therefore, when quoting them, we name the organization but not the individual representing it.

Four of the associations are national in scope with links across Canada and head offices in Ottawa or Toronto and representatives in Montreal. They are the Canadian Arab Federation, the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC), the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations-Canada. Four are located in Montreal: *Le Centre Culturel Algérien*, *Présence Musulmane Canada*, the Canadian Muslim Forum, and the Muslim Council of Montreal. Two more are located in Quebec City: the *Carrefour Culturel Sésame de Québec* and *Le Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec*.

The National Council on Canada-Arab Relations is not an Arab association, strictly speaking. Although it was founded by citizens of Arab origin, its board of directors and its membership include individuals who are not necessarily of Arab background but who feel concerned by the need to improve relations between Canada and the Arab world. The council plays a major role in advocacy and mobilization pertaining to Arab issues, and we felt it was important to include it in our sample.

Some of these associations define themselves specifically as Muslim. This choice is natural when they have goals related specifically to the practice of religion. When the aims of these associations include intervening publicly and being a means of political expression, this generally indicates an ideological orientation that places religion at the heart of political identity. It should therefore be no surprise that associations such as the CIC and the Council on American-Islamic Relations-Canada take rather conservative positions. They were favourable to the proposal of establishing sharia-based arbitration tribunals on family matters in Ontario, and they actively promote the wearing of the hijab, which they present as a religious obligation. This is an issue of contention within Muslim societies, in which some religious jurists believe that wearing the hijab is not an obligation.

The positions taken by associations that put religion at the centre of their political action reflect the great debate occurring in Arab and Muslim societies on secularism and the role of religion in politics (Antonius 2008). Such positions may be contrasted with those of the secular associations, which define themselves either by their goals (e.g., *Sésame*'s goals are social and cultural) or by the culture of their countries of origin (Arab, Berber, etc.) rather than by religion. With regard to the associations in which we conducted interviews, both ideological positions were represented.

We begin with an overview of the main orientations that have shaped the federal policy of multiculturalism and the Quebec policy of interculturalism in the 1990s and 2000s. We then look at how these associations assess them.

The Policies of Multiculturalism and Interculturalism

The federal character of Canada has resulted in the existence of several locations that produce public policies on management of diversity. This dual reality poses a sizable challenge to the Canadian state as it seeks to deal with its eternal identity deficit. Many Québécois and English-Canadian intellectuals see the genesis of multiculturalism policy as a strategy for controlling the Quebec nationalist movement (for an analytical survey of such attitudes see Labelle 2008a). This public policy contradicts Quebec's policy of interculturalism. Two models for integration are thus in competition and are a source of confusion within Quebec society. Multiculturalism policy rests on a centralizing vision of federalism, which is incompatible with the existence of societies that define themselves as nations, as do Quebec and Aboriginal peoples (Labelle and Rocher 2006).

Canadian Multiculturalism

Two major factors have influenced the Canadian policy of multiculturalism: the economy and security. Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002) advance the thesis that policies on immigration, multiculturalism ,and even employment equity have been subordinated to the imperatives and logic imposed by the business community (see also Parant 2001, 25; Satzewich and Wong 2003; Woroby 2005, 252). The new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2002, emphasizes protection of the "secure character of our society and respect for our values and standards in terms of social responsibility" as well as a number of other initiatives taken to harmonize security policies with those of the United States. The Anti-terrorism Act (C-36), promulgated in December 2001, is of great concern to groups defending rights and freedoms as well as to political circles (Drache 2004; Whitaker 2003; Antonius, Labelle, and Rocher 2007; see also Thompson, Chapter 3, this volume).

Canadian multiculturalism policy has also been subject to challenges. Some analysts (e.g., Kymlicka) have come to its defence. For decades, however, many have pointed to its shortcomings or perverse effects, for example the overshadowing of racialized groups and First Nations that characterized early variants of multiculturalism. According to Kobayashi (2000, 236), "multiculturalism is a policy of containment rather than one that promotes social justice and reduces the effects of discrimination in our society." For Day (2000, 179), multiculturalism policies have led to a "progressive officialization of both Self and Other identities." It is a "hypermodern disciplinary regime that seeks to maintain a precarious articulation between the Canadian state [and] two dominant nations and cultures clipped back as ethnicities or national minorities" (208). Day also denounces a condescending postcolonial attitude that, among other things, perpetuates the colonial status of Aboriginal peoples.

Several authors note that multiculturalism has not succeeded in eliminating racism in the labour market. Moreover, since 9/11, international immigration has been associated with the loss of Canadian values, changes in Canada's social fabric, and a weakening of social cohesion. From Li's (2003b, 9) perspective, "racialized new immigrants are represented as endless intruders to urban and social space." Multiculturalism policy is considered inadequate for dealing with the challenge of social cohesion in Canadian society (Reitz and Banerjee 2007). Investigations conducted in Canada show a significant and persistent gap between government visions of "living together" and the systemic obstacles encountered by racialized minorities (Biles, Ibrahim, and Tolley 2005; Galabuzi 2006). Forms of inequality and discrimination endure or even get worse, undermining a sense of belonging to the Canadian nation (Warburton 2007). However, in Modood's (2007, 47) view, "where multiculturalism has been accepted and has operated as a state or national project (in Canada, Australia and Malaysia, for example), it was not an accidental dimension but was an integral part of a project of national construction."

In 2005, the Multiculturalism Program identified four areas that required attention if it was to fulfill its policy goals: (1) fostering cross-cultural understanding (through initiatives to help people to understand cultural differences and to integrate them into Canada's general culture); (2) combating racism and discrimination; (3) promoting shared citizenship; and (4) making Canadian institutions more reflective of Canadian diversity (Canadian Heritage 2005a, 3-9).

The notion of "productive diversity" became increasingly well established within the Canadian Heritage ministry. In facing the challenges of globalization, multiculturalism has become a tool of economic profit (Burstein 2004). Diversity has also been associated with the theme of security and risk, creating sharp tensions between the goals of multiculturalism, the essentialist view that is taken of certain groups, and individual rights. Religious diversity in particular lies at the heart of the debate. Recently, Canadian Heritage officials in charge of promoting citizenship have said that the country "has moved beyond the mosaic model of the 1970s and entered an era of 'integrative multiculturalism' that requires, in part, a battle against youth extremism and religious radicals" (Freeze 2008b). Indeed, the trend in Ottawa is increasingly towards promoting integration rather than specificity, and several declarations made by Jason Kenney, minister of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism, are along these lines (see, for example, Buzetti 2009).

The issue of racism emerged in the early 1970s after a critique of the limits of multiculturalism. For Patel (2007, 259), racism constitutes "an important public policy issue." This is why, in 2005, following Canada's commitment "to embrace the principles of the World Conference against Racism" and following the report of the United Nations Human Rights

Commission's special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism (Diène 2004), the government responded with *Canada's Action Plan Against Racism* (Canadian Heritage 2005b). However, the Canadian government announced in the summer of 2008 that it would not attend the next World Conference Against Racism on the pretext that some of the voices to be heard there would themselves be conveying racist thinking. It seems that geostrategic calculations (especially with regard to US policy in the Middle East), rather than concern about racism, lie behind this decision. Evidently the Conservative government had, at this time, fully aligned itself with George W. Bush's Middle East policies, and it saw any criticism of Israeli policies as racism (see Amery, Chapter 2, this volume). This positioning had important implications for Ottawa's relations with Muslim and Arab groups, as is seen below.

Quebec Interculturalism

Quebec public policy recognizes and values ethnocultural diversity and views it from a perspective of interculturalism and convergence towards an inclusive citizenship. But, contrary to what has occurred at the federal level, there is no "Interculturalism Act" in Quebec. Some authors assert that the two visions of dealing with diversity converge, although Quebec, being at the crossroads of British influences and French republican spirit, is more "integrationist." Others put more emphasis on the divergences between the two visions (for a detailed analysis, see Labelle 2008b).

Quebec's aim of redefining itself as a host society with French-language integration began to manifest itself in the 1960s. The Quebec government then attempted to consolidate its powers in the area of immigration to ensure Quebec's demographic and political weight within the Canadian federation and to counter the anglicization of immigrants on its territory. For this purpose, it created a ministry of immigration in 1968 and negotiated a series of agreements with the federal government. Following the reports of various commissions of inquiry on language practices, the Charter of the French Language (1977), often referred to as Bill 101, defined French, the majority language of the population, as Quebec's sole official language. It also set a framework for the basic language rights of all Quebecers. This founding moment witnessed a coherent series of "diversity management" measures to counter discrimination, to promote equality, and to protect fundamental rights. These measures include the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1975), employment equity programs, adaptations of public services, intercultural training, measures for reasonable accommodation, and so on.

Like Canadian multiculturalism, interculturalism policy went from promoting differences in the late 1970s to promoting inclusive citizenship and participation in the 2000s. However, the Quebec policy presents one fundamental difference to federal policy: it aims to consolidate a sense of belonging to Quebec, which is viewed as a minority nation within the Canadian federation. This minority situation explains why vocabulary and political referents have varied depending on the government in power (federalist or sovereignist). In 1981, a government led by the Parti Québécois (sovereignist) developed a policy of cultural convergence involving the idea of rapprochement and understanding between cultures within Quebec society, defined as a nation.

During the 1990s, a new policy statement on immigration and integration, developed under a government led by the Quebec Liberal Party (federalist), produced significant referents in Quebec's discourse on integration and interculturalism. Viewed as equals in terms of rights and obligations, immigrants were invited, despite their differences, to adhere to a common public culture defined by the democratic character of its institutions, the equality of all citizens before the law, the commonality of the French language, the embrace of a diverse heritage, and pluralism. The policy then referred to Quebec as a "distinct society."

The return to power of the Parti Québécois in 1994 had a decisive political impact on the Quebec government's orientation towards the idea of a "civic nation." It encouraged all citizens of Quebec, including new immigrants, to develop a sense of belonging to the Quebec political community and to embrace a common civic framework rather than a "common public culture." Under that government, citizenship was defined as a political attribute common to all people residing in Quebec.

With the Quebec Liberal Party's return to power in 2003, a new action plan entitled *Shared Values, Common Interests* was released. Two dimensions of the plan are especially noteworthy. First, the plan argues for the importance of a civic and normative framework within which members of ethnocultural communities should be invited to integrate. Second, it emphasizes the need to ensure the survival of the French character of Quebec through the learning of the French language. The action plan proposes two goals: (1) broadening the opening to diversity by encouraging intercultural rapprochement and dialogue and (2) fighting discrimination and intercommunity tensions (MRCI 2004, 80).

To sum up, federal multiculturalism policy and Quebec interculturalism policy experience similar tensions when attempting to balance respect for diversity with belonging to a political community. "Political community," of course, is defined differently according to whether it refers to Canada or Quebec. This political context forms the background against which Arab and Muslim associations set out their line of thinking.

The Viewpoint of Arab and Muslim Associations

Our objective is to identify how the associations that express the concerns of citizens of Arab origin – particularly Muslim Arabs – look upon the normative rhetoric of the Canadian state and the Quebec state, respectively. Our research strategy is based on a documentary analysis of the position papers, publications, and communiqués of the associations mentioned in the introduction of this chapter and on interviews with their representatives. Between March and November 2006, we conducted ten in-depth interviews with them. We organized our observations around five themes: (1) the way multiculturalism and interculturalism policies are perceived, (2) issues related to integration, (3) the role of religion in the public space, (4) the issue of racism and policies to overcome it, and (5) the relations between the states (Canada and Quebec) and Arab and Muslim associations.

Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Convergences and Divergences

Most associations did not clearly distinguish between the notions of multiculturalism and interculturalism, but they differed in their attitudes towards Quebec's interculturalism according to whether their ideological orientation was secular or religious.

Two cross-Canada associations – the CAF and the CIC – have a clear position on federal multiculturalism policy. In a report presented in 2002, the CAF (2002, 9) presented the results of a survey confirming support for multiculturalism: "This [support for multiculturalism] reinforces the pride and affinity in both Arab and Canadian identities ... Being able to keep one's ethnic culture and merge it with a Canadian one was clearly viewed favourably by respondents." As for the CIC, its representative stated: "Overall, the official multicultural policy was really healthy for society, because it officially recognizes the fact that I can say: 'I am a Muslim, I speak this language, and my country accepted that, and then giving time to people to buy into it'" (quoted in Labelle, Rocher, and Antonius 2009, 125). Yet, she also criticized its implementation: "Multiculturalism was very good in giving people a sense of security, and still does, but it is stagnating, because governments have refused to take it to the next level" (ibid., 126; see also CAF 2005).

The Canadian Muslim Forum (CMF), based in Montreal, also supports the "concept of multiculturalism" but without distinguishing between the federal and Quebec public policies, and with more emphasis on the notion of integration. The spokesperson for the CMF stated: "For the moment, there may be political currents that want to revise the concept of multiculturalism. But what we are aiming for and targeting is the socio-economic integration and harmonization of relations between citizens in general and citizens of Muslim faith and Arab origin" (Labelle, Rocher, and Antonius 2009).[1]

The Montreal-based Centre Culturel Algérien and the two Quebec City-based associations are clearly in favour of the goals set by Quebec's interculturalism policy, and they employ its key notions – intercultural understanding, common public culture, a sense of belonging to Quebec – in their discourse. The Carrefour Culturel Sésame du Québec (see www.ccsq.org) sets for itself the mission "of promoting within Québec society the cultural diversity of the Maghreb and Arab world in its wealth and multi-ethnicity" and "of fitting in with Québec's common public culture." The Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec shares similar goals. According to its spokesperson, federal multiculturalism policy leads to the segregation of ethnocultural groups. He brings up issues raised in Quebec City as to whether or not multiculturalism is an entryway for religious fundamentalism.

Most organizations, however, are preoccupied with the dominance of security concerns at the expense of multiculturalism. The CAF (2003, 3) declares a "need to determine, as a society, how to combine our desire to respect human rights and multiculturalism with our need to protect our security and trade interests."

Issues Related to Integration

The positions of the spokespeople converge far more when it comes to the notion of integration. There is a consensus that there are important obstacles to social and economic integration stemming from conditions within the host society and that the proper response to this is more political participation on the part of Muslim and Arab groups.

According to the CIC, Muslims and Arabs face particular obstacles, especially because of conflicts in the Middle East. These conflicts have contributed to their social, political, and economic marginalization, which explains the importance of emphasizing integration.

The representatives of the CAF and of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada note a sharp increase in job discrimination against Muslims and Arabs. The post-9/11 situation has had a negative impact on their access to the job market: concerns among business executives who need employees who can cross the Canada-US border or dismissals that have sometimes followed a visit by CSIS to an employee's workplace. The CAF recommends that the federal government strengthen employment equity programs and intervene actively in the recognition of diplomas and skills acquired abroad (CAF 2005, 2). The concerns and recommendations of the Montreal-based Centre Culturel Algérien are similar.

A spokesperson for the Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec laments the Quebec government's absence of leadership in the area of employment equity programs: "The government lacks credibility to give lessons to the private sector when the government itself has failed in its task of integrating, in its civil service and in the state-owned sector, enough women, Native people, handicapped persons, anglophones, and members of ethnocultural communities, especially the two most vulnerable groups, as proven by statistics, namely, blacks and Arab Muslims."

Another dimension of integration involves civic and political participation, a goal vigorously defended by every organization. The CAF is very active during election periods and encourages Arab and Muslim Canadians to vote. In collaboration with the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, the CAF meets ministers and prepares questionnaires that it issues to all political parties so that they can convey their positions on topics of interest to Arab communities – namely, security, immigration, and foreign policy. The CAF's analyses following the 2004 and 2006 federal elections show the influence that Arab and Muslim minorities could have on the outcome of elections in various ridings across Canada.

According to a representative of the CIC, countering the influence of certain fundamentalist imams who urge Muslims not to vote and not to run as electoral candidates represents a stiff challenge. According to these imams, Muslims should stay away from institutions that are not Islamic. This remark is among the few comments indicating that there is resistance, in some conservative circles, to the very idea of participating in institutions that are not Islamic. Among the range of values put forth by these conservative imams, only non-participation in the political system was mentioned as an attitude to be countered.

In Quebec, the CMF promotes citizen participation at every level. During the January 2006 federal election, the Muslim Council of Montreal circulated a memo among the leaders of Muslim associations reminding them of the importance of voting. In its bulletin, *Échos*, the Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec also issued a reminder of the importance of exercising the right to vote. *Présence Musulmane* (2006) "promotes a participatory citizenship nurtured by a contextualized understanding of Islam and an open identity while cultivating harmonious living together in our society." Citizen commitment involves educational work:

> We want dialogue. This targets people who seek to educate themselves about the issues that concern the Muslim community and Islam in general, but it is also to educate Muslims. We want Muslims to be ready to commit themselves, to participate, to become integrated in Québec life and Canadian life. (ibid)

The Centre Culturel Algérien (2003, 14) defends democratic values above all but also refers to identity:

> In addition to being naturally open, Québec society offers us the opportunity to live within our various plural cultures. It is interesting to note that, without the adoption of democratic values, which form the basis of Québec society and of its institutions, it is practically impossible to achieve real citizenship.

The Role of Religion in Public Institutions

The role of religion in public institutions raises issues among all the Arab and Muslim associations that we interviewed. Most of them have taken public positions on the rights to prayer spaces in universities, the wearing of the hijab in schools, and faith-based arbitration in Ontario, but there are important differences among them as some are clearly secular and others clearly religious.

The CIC and the CMF support the conclusions of Marion Boyd's (2004) report proposing official recognition of Islamic faith-based arbitration in family disputes and inheritance in Ontario. The report also recommends that such arbitration should be subjected to certain constraints in order to make it compatible with Canadian law. The CMF argues that, in Canada, which defines itself as a multicultural society, the right to faith-based arbitration is protected under section 2a of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which refers to the freedom of conscience and religion (CMWC/CMF 2005a). For its part, the CIC (2005b) "fully supports the implementation of Marion Boyd's report, as it outlines sufficient checks and balances."

Fearing the impact of the Boyd Report on Quebec, and in line with its understanding of interculturalism (as opposed to multiculturalism), the Quebec National Assembly adopted a unanimous motion in May 2005 opposing the establishment of Islamic tribunals in Quebec and in Canada. This motion was submitted jointly by two members of the National Assembly, one (a Muslim) from the Liberal Party and the other from the Parti Québécois. In reaction to this initiative, CAIR-CAN (2005b) published a press release, signed by twenty-five other Muslim organizations, condemning the motion and asking for it to be withdrawn: "In the name of the Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, we condemn this motion that singles out citizens of the Muslim faith and thus discriminates against their religion. We demand its withdrawal."

On the other hand, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (which is not among the associations covered in this research) launched a vigorous campaign against government recognition of sharia-based arbitration, deeming that it would legalize the violation of Muslim women's rights. The CMC shared this position. The other secular-leaning associations did not support the Boyd Report. Some of them, however, denounced the reactions the issue had provoked, including the motion in the Quebec National Assembly, agreeing that Muslims had been singled out. These variations in reactions to the Boyd Report reflect the ideological cleavages marking the Arab and Muslim worlds.

All associations defining themselves as Muslim spoke out in favour of the wearing of the hijab in public and private schools. Not so the secular-oriented associations. The spokesperson for the CAF, for instance, refrained from speaking on behalf of Muslims since the federation represents citizens who think of themselves, first and foremost, as being of Arab origin (a definition that includes non-Muslims as well as many Muslims who are critical of a rigid and conservative Islam). *Sésame* also presents itself as an apolitical and areligious association. Its spokesperson stated: "We are in a secular space, and we have no recommendations in this matter."

The representative of the Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec denounced the over-preoccupation of some Muslims with accommodations relating to the practice of religion in the public space. He stated that what was really at stake were issues relating to security and civil rights, racial profiling, and job discrimination. This, he felt, should be what mobilizes Muslim communities.

Racism

Racism is a major issue for all associations. A number of representatives referred to the report of the United Nations special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance following his mission to Canada (Diène 2004). Since the events of 9/11, Muslims, and occasionally non-Muslim Arabs, have increasingly been victims of discrimination on the part of private actors and government.

CAIR-CAN, together with the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, notes that the Ontario Human Rights Commission has included Islamophobia, which it views as a contemporary and emerging form of racism, in its policy to combat racism and discrimination. In a report published in 2005, CAIR-CAN mentions the situation of racial profiling with regard to Muslims. According to a survey conducted among a volunteer sample of 467 Muslims, 8 percent of respondents had been contacted by national security agents and a majority of the persons involved were young Arab males. Twenty-four percent of the persons targeted said they felt they were harassed and were victims of discrimination. A large number (23 percent) of visits by security agents occurred at the workplace and, in some cases, this led to dismissals or to enduring stigma. The CAIR-CAN study concludes that this problem also calls into question the role of the institutions put in charge of security. These institutions, which are responsible for ensuring the security of all Canadians, paradoxically make use of profiling practices with regard to a segment of the Canadian population, raising questions about their trustworthiness in the area of equity (CAIR-CAN 2005a; see also Amery, Chapter 2, this volume). A CAF spokesperson eloquently explains this process:

> Racism, after 9/11, became more racial profiling, and it became systemic, in the sense that security agencies, across the board, from CSIS, to the RCMP, to the provincial polices, to the city polices, all of a sudden, all became involved with security issues [and] approached our communities in a very clumsy, ignorant, and abusive way. Because they, like the rest of the Canadian population, did not know our community, and they have all of a sudden 1 million people who are potentially a threat to the country. So they went on “fishing” expeditions, spreading very wide, and naturally, under [those] kind of circumstances, you have a lot of innocent people getting caught ... And the net should not have been spread that wide in the first place.

The CAF has been active in the area of fighting racism: developing an action plan to eliminate hatred on the internet, holding meetings with the hate crimes division of the Toronto police, meeting with community leaders, and participating in forums and conferences. The CAF can call upon a pool of resources and people who are prepared to give training and information sessions to various institutions on the Arab world and Arab minorities. Further, the CAF provides material to schools, the media, and legal institutions to combat anti-Arab racism.

Between 1998 and 2003, the CIC prepared a number of research studies on the treatment of Muslims and Islam in the Canadian media. A content analysis of nine newspapers (the *National Post*, the *Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Star*, the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Montreal Gazette*, *La Presse*, the *Winnipeg Free Press*, the *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, and the *Toronto Sun*) gave rise to the publication of an annual report exposing the demonization of Muslims and of Islam. It should be mentioned, however, that although these reports are of general interest, their methodology is not rigorous. For example, they consider that speaking of "Islamism" or "Islamic terrorism" is a sign of Islamophobia. However, speaking of "Islamic terrorism" is legitimate when political players commit violent actions (that can be viewed as terrorism) and justify them in the name of Islam.

The Muslim Council of Montreal (MCM) and the CMF are also worried by the role of the media. On several occasions, the MCM (2004) has denounced comments on Arabs and Muslims in the CanWest Global newspapers. A CMF (2001) press release, issued in the wake of 9/11, asked that the media pursue "their ethical and professional role in promoting integration rather than promoting exclusion by spreading mistrust and doubt with respect to Muslim communities." Furthermore, the CMF condemned "any attempts to associate Islam or Canadians and Quebecers of Muslim faith or Arab origin with terrorist acts" (ibid).

The Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec (CCIQ) has also pursued various activities involving the struggle against racism. The CCIQ participates with other community organizations in a project entitled *Pont entre le Milieu et les Musulmans* (bridge between the community and Muslims). This project aims to "facilitate integration and life within a single shared community while respecting cultural differences" (CCIQ 2006, 20).

CAIR-CAN has prepared a guide for Muslim Canadians called *Know Your Rights*. The guide offers advice for ensuring the respect of Muslims' rights in various situations. It outlines the rights of employees, students, and airline passengers; advises persons contacted by CSIS or the RCMP; and sets out steps to take following a hate crime to ensure security near mosques (CAIR-CAN 2004). CAIR-CAN offers several publications, each exploring a particular aspect of Muslim life in Canada: *A Journalist's Guide to Islam; A Health Care Provider's Guide to Islamic Religious Practices; An Employer's Guide to Islamic Religious Practice;* and *An Educator's Guide to Islamic Religious Practice*.

Although there have been suggestions for courses of action in the fight against racism, none of the Arab or Muslim groups has commented on A Canada for All: Canada's Action Plan Against Racism, which Ottawa published in 2005. It should be noted that this plan did not receive broad public response and that the associations interviewed were more concerned with tangible results than with statements of principles.

Relations between the State and Arab and Muslim associations

Communication between the associations and the governments occurs at two levels: (1) links with decision makers (ministers and legislators) who create multiculturalism or interculturalism programs and (2) links with civil servants who implement such programs. The first type of contact takes the form of ad hoc meetings during special events (including the participation of elected officials in social or religious activities), occasional participation in elections (generally through influential individuals rather than in the form of party endorsement by an association), and, finally, meetings solicited to present demands. These contacts provide for symbolic gestures of recognition (e.g., appointing certain individuals to positions such as membership on the Immigration and Refugee Board). These measures, however, had a very marginal effect on Arab and Muslim communities as a whole.

Contacts with civil servants take place when applying for government grants and subsidies to support community activities or through participating in consultation processes (e.g., the Maghreb roundtable at the Quebec Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities). Several spokespersons felt that these consultation processes had a very limited effect.

Generally, Arab and Muslim associations do not have the feeling that they are truly influential. For example, one leader from *Centre Culturel Islamique de Québec* produced a harsh analysis of the political role played by Arab and Muslim associations:

> There is an absence of a culture of organization, of a culture of commitment, that is extremely prejudicial when, in other situations, things go out of control ... [W]e come from societies that are emerging from the long colonial night, that have been hit hard by failing independences and dictatorships ... We do not have a culture of law, a culture of organization, a culture of citizenship ... And some members of our communities seem to enjoy the ghetto and feed the temptation of ghettoization ... [I] find this highly deplorable, even if we are very new in this country.

The CAF representative noted that Arab and Muslim communities are not yet rooted in Canadian society:

> The majority of Arab Canadians arrived in the country after the 1950s and 1960s. They are thus not deeply rooted in this country. A majority are first-generation people who may have an accent, who are too afraid to speak, who are perhaps not very eloquent in English or French, who need to work and so have other fish to fry ... Thus they focus much more on studies. We now need to be in the political parties, we have to do volunteer work, we have to go clean tables and distribute pamphlets and do all sorts of little things, work that really may not be worthwhile but that has to be done with our children. The Italians and Jews have done this very well.

Sésame considers its influence on public policies or government decisions to be very limited. Similarly, the CAF spokesperson notes: “They listen to us. No, they hear us, but they do not yet listen to us. We have their attention, we have fine words, but we do not yet have much in the way of results.”

The CIC identifies problems regarding the choice, by the various layers of government, of the interlocutors within the Muslim communities. According to its representative, the political positions of interlocutors on the issues in the Middle East are put under the microscope by other political players who have an ability to influence decisions. The CMF spokesperson notes the fragmentation of Arab and Muslim groups, something that harms their potential for representation:

> The community is fragmented. There is not really any platform that unites all community organizations, which is a failure on our part. This is why, in political situations, there are not really any direct links. We are the ones who take the initiative of calling the government.

The spokesperson for Sésame views the selection process as subjective:

> Who today can claim to be a leader of the Arab community? Nobody ... Because we have to admit that the Arab or Arab Muslim community, by its very essence, is highly divided ... it is very difficult for anyone to speak on behalf of the entire Arab community.

Inequality of resources at the national and transnational levels is also a fundamental problem for many other associations involved in defending ethnocultural minorities (Labelle, Rocher, and Field 2004).

The events of 9/11 led the Canadian and Quebec governments to refocus their policies in the area of immigration and the management of ethnocultural diversity. The expression of different goals (labour supply and everything that flows from this, respect for human rights and security, integration of minorities and preservation of national identity, etc.) has become more complex in the current security climate and with the rise of neoconservatism.

We contrast the Canadian government's conception of multiculturalism with Quebec's conception of interculturalism. Interculturalism differs from multiculturalism in one fundamental respect: it calls for intercultural integration and rapprochement aimed at consolidating a sense of belonging to Quebec, which is seen as a minority nation within the Canadian federation. This difference between these two sets of policies means that Arab or Muslim associations will confront the policies of the state over different sets of issues, depending on the government with which they are dealing. They will oppose the Canadian government over issues related to foreign policy and security, while they will oppose the Quebec government over issues related to social integration and religious accommodation. Both governments, however, share the blame for taking insufficient action to effect the economic integration of Arabs and Muslims and for their weak response to discrimination and racism.

There is also a geographical cleavage among associations concerning attitudes towards interculturalism and multiculturalism. While spokespeople for the Toronto-based pan-Canadian associations refer directly to multiculturalism policies, which they value highly and whose vocabulary they borrow, spokespeople for associations in Quebec City refer more readily to interculturalism, and they have shown more understanding of this orientation. The Montreal-based associations do not refer explicitly to how these policies are implemented but, rather, focus on the lack of results with regard to equality and non-discrimination.

On the basis of the social debates surrounding them, we can assert that the two policies of multiculturalism and interculturalism have a different impact on the place of religion in public institutions. Policies inspired by multiculturalism tend to accommodate the religious practice in public institutions, while policies inspired by interculturalism tend to be more reluctant to do this. It follows that those associations that put religion at the centre of their identity are more vocal on issues of religious accommodation. They also tend to be very critical of the Quebec policy of interculturalism and very active in their opposition to secular-oriented policies. They favour the Boyd Report's recommendation of sharia-based arbitration in family disputes and attribute its final rejection (and the abolition of official religious arbitration in Ontario) to racism. The secular-oriented associations also support religious freedom but are less inclined to support conservative conceptions of religion. The fight for prayer spaces in public secular institutions is not one of their priorities, but they denounce the portrayal of Islam and Muslims as a danger to the secular orientation of Quebec society.

These positions are highly significant. First, it can be concluded that conservative currents have not been met with unanimity among the Muslim associations. In fact, we claim that such currents represent a minority position, albeit a highly vocal one. We can also conclude that the feeling of exclusion that results from stigmatization is shared by every association – religious or secular – and by many non-Muslim Arabs. This feeling clearly transcends the ideological and political differences found in these communities. For them, Arabophobia and Islamophobia are major social issues, attributed to the international context and the "war on terror." Some of them prepare and supply information material to fight racism, and they seek government action plans. The media are singled out for their role in legitimizing racism and exclusionary attitudes towards Muslims.

All the associations have opposed the security policy of the Canadian government on two grounds. The first is that, in its implementation, this policy embodies stereotypes that lead directly to systematic racial profiling; the other is that the policy fits in with a conception of foreign policy that is seen as unfair and biased. Security is seen as a way of implementing this foreign policy: it is not seen as being genuinely inspired by security concerns. An illustration of the political function of the security policy is provided by the banning of British MP George Galloway from entering Canada on security grounds in March 2009. Galloway is a vocal critic of Western policies towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. His banning provoked the mobilization of most of the associations interviewed here in an attempt to pressure the government to let him in. Galloway was vindicated by a court decision that criticized the Conservative government for its decision to ban him, and this brought to light the fact that the Canadian security apparatus had clearly established that his visit had raised no security concerns. Clearly, the Conservative government used security reasons as an excuse to hide the political nature of its decision to ban Galloway from Canada. This instrumentalization of the notion of security explains why Arab and Muslim associations, as well as many observers, consider the security agenda to be a convenient way to sell political decisions to the Canadian public – by playing on its fears.

All the associations denounce forms of inequality and discrimination that are obstacles to integration, especially in its economic dimension, and they also denounce government inactivity with regard to correcting this situation. All the associations vigorously defend the goal of civic and political participation as this is seen as a way of addressing the marginalization and discrimination suffered by their members. However, only some of the associations work directly to promote their members' participation in elections, either as voters or as candidates.

None of the associations felt that they are really heard by political decision makers, even if they are listened to occasionally. Leaders attribute this situation either to the recent character of immigration, as the associations created by the newcomers did not have enough time and history behind them to acquire credibility and political efficiency, or to a lack of organized political culture among Arab and Muslim groups.

Conclusion

This synthesis enables us to make the following general observations. The first is that the discourse of the Arab and Muslim advocacy associations focuses on the *results* of diversity management policies rather than on underlying political ideologies. In spite of the fact that they do not explicitly discuss the differences between the two official policies, they formulate their demands in the language that is dominant in their context: the pan-Canadian associations refer explicitly to multiculturalism, which they say they espouse, while those in Quebec City adopt the language and goals of interculturalism. Others make no clear distinction between these two orientations, but it is unclear whether this is due to lack of knowledge or to political strategy.

Basically, the associations cling to culture as a value because, through culture, they can legitimize respect for diversity and for their identity. No explicit mention is made of the "national question" in Quebec politics, even when the language of interculturalism is adopted. For a majority of the associations, the relation with the Quebec state is more instrumental than ideological. But the implicit adoption of one or other of these two types of political philosophy (interculturalism or multiculturalism) has consequences for the associations' visions and means of action, even if their actual demands remain very similar. The pan-Canadian associations based in Toronto and Ottawa may tend to engage in the dynamics of ethnicizing politics – in other words, forming Muslim or Arab lobbies – whereas individuals involved in the associations in Quebec City and some in Montreal tend to engage in civic action, conveying the concerns of their community within broader associative frameworks. A number of such individuals are active in sovereignist movements, for example, although the associations themselves take no position on this issue.

The second observation is that, despite the normative discourse of the state at both levels of government regarding the issue of inclusion and citizenship, there is a long way to go. The viewpoints expressed by Arab and Muslim advocacy associations also show this gap between norm and application. The lack of integration on the labour market, shortcomings in civic and political participation, biases in how Arabs and Muslims are presented in the media, the taking into account of the religious aspect in the public sphere, discrimination based on Islamophobia and Arabophobia: these are all painful issues that arouse serious concerns.

The third observation is that the associations whose members we interviewed believe that the obstacles to integration originate at the highest political levels. Therefore, the need for corrective action is also located at these levels rather than, say, at the level of the programs that have actually been implemented. A number of leaders state that, in order to obtain real change, there is a need to intervene with the ministers who come up with the programs rather than with the civil servants who administer them. We interpret this diagnosis as follows: where Arabs and Muslims are concerned, the deep causes of marginalization are political rather than systemic. In effect, it is not the institutions' abstract rules that affect Arabs/Muslims more than other immigrants; rather, it is political factors.

The fourth observation to some degree follows from the second one: security policies are the engine of discriminatory processes and end up influencing the lives of Arab and Muslim immigrants on a daily basis. High unemployment rates among people from the Maghreb, for example, have been accentuated by political events such as those of 9/11, by the resulting security policies, and by the media discourse that has marginalized them (see Antonius, Chapter 6, this volume).

The positions taken by associations that put religion at the centre of their political action relate to the ongoing debate in Arab and Muslim societies regarding secularism and the role of religion in politics. These are contrasted with secular associations, which define themselves either through their social and political goals or through the culture of their countries of origin rather than through religion. Both are represented in the sample; however, ideological cleavages do not emerge with respect to diversity management policies but, rather, with respect to positions on specific issues (such as arbitration tribunals). This is due to the fact that one premise of diversity policies – in particular multiculturalism – is that all demands made in the name of religion or culture are admissible. Hence, such demands – and the associations that make them – do not have to submit to critical assessment because this would be a sign of stigmatization and exclusion. Moreover, among the voices challenging some of the demands made in the name of religion, it is possible to identify two positions. One seeks inclusion and equality for religious minorities, while the other displays a deep mistrust of "otherness." It is not easy to criticize conservative trends without risking inciting the marginalization and stigmatization of whole communities. This delicate and difficult task is one of the challenges that research in the area of immigration, ethnicity, and citizenship must address.